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His prior counsel having died during the pendency of the
appeal, Raymond Phillip Cabututan, Defendant and Appellant, by and
through his newly appointed attorney, A.W. Lauritzen and pursuant
to Rule 35 of the Utah rules of Appellate Procedure, respectfully
submits this petition for rehearing•
The granting of this petition seems compelling in light of the
following points:
Point 1. The Court overlooked or misapprehended the impact of
inherent conflicts created by the issue of Defendant's Counsel's
own ineffective assistance as trial counsel•
Point 2. The Court overlooked or misapprehended the impact of
inherent conflicts created by appointed trial counsel raising and
arguing

in a motion for a new trial the issue as to his own

ineffective assistance in his former capacity as trial counsel.
Point 3.
failure

to

The Court overlooked appointed appellate Counsel's
follow

the

proper

procedures

and

guidelines

in

submitting a purported Anders brief.
Point 4.

In the event of collateral attack, the reviewing

court may well consider itself bound by or at least give deference
to the

findings

inherently

necessary

to

support this

court's

opinion.
Point 5.

The opinion of this court remanding this matter to

the trial court for a new hearing on Defendant's motion for a new
trial, as it now stands, suggests that the scope of Defendant's
motion is limited to the issues and arguments raised by prior
counsel.
1

DISCUSSION OF POINT 1
Point 1, The Court overlooked the inherent conflict created
by appointed appellate counsel raising and arguing on direct appeal
the issue as to his own ineffective assistance as trial counsel.
Appointed appellate counsel, Quinn D. Hunsaker, raised and
argued on appeal, both in Point I and Point III of the Brief of
Appellant, pages 19-29, 39-43 that the Defendant/Appellant

was

deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance
of trial counsel.

The State's Brief at page 27 correctly notes

that appellate counsel was also trial counsel in this case.
This Court in State v. Humphries, 818 P2d 1027 (Utah 1991)
held that the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
should be raised on appeal if the trial record

is adequate to

permit decision of the issue and if the Defendant is represented by
counsel other than trial counsel.
This Court in Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873 (Utah 1990) citing
Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547 (Utah 1989) stated as follows:
The Court reasoned that counsel who represented the
petitioner both at trial and on appeal could not
effectively present an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim on appeal when that argument would necessarily have
challenged his own performance at trial and on appeal.
The California Court of Appeals in People v. Bailey, 12 Cal.
Rptr.

2d 339

(Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1992) held that there

is an

inherent conflict when trial council is ultimately appointed to act
as counsel on appeal; the California court noted that counsel is in
the

discomfiting

and

untenable

position

of

urging

his

own

incompetency.
Other Courts have espoused similar views. In State v. Suarez,
2

670 p2d 1192, 1204 (Ariz. App. 1983) the Arizona Court of Appeals
observed:
However, if this issue is presented on appeal, it is
improper for appellate counsel to argue his own
ineffectiveness at trial because, as a matter of policy,
it is difficult for counsel to objectively review his own
performance and zealously argue any inadequacies in that
performance on behalf of his client. In addition, one
can easily perceive the potential for abuse if appellate
counsel is permitted to raise, evaluate and advocate his
effectiveness as trial counsel.
If counsel honestly
believes he was ineffective at trial or that such issue
exists, he should so advise his client, seek leave to
withdraw and have new counsel appointed to raise the
issue on appeal, or pursue the matter under Rule 32,
Arizona R. Crim. P.
A cursory reading of the analysis of Defendant's

counsel

reveals his inability to deal with this self depreciation.

Worse

yet, what of an inadequate counsel who truly believes he has done
well.

Does Counsel appear to excuse lapses in his representation

at trial by blaming factors beyond his control.
The Ohio Court of Appeals in State v. Fuller, 581 N.E.2d 614,
618 (Ohio App.2d Dist. 1990) held that appointed appellate counsel
is presumed incapable of making an effective argument as to his own
ineffectiveness as trial counsel and went on to say that:
Where, as here, an indigent criminal defendant decides to
argue on appeal that he has been deprived of the
effective assistance of trial counsel, and has made a
request to the trial counsel, and has made a request to
the trial court that a lawyer, other than his trial
counsel, be appointed to represent him on appeal, we
conclude, based upon Penson v. Ohiof 488 U.S. 75 (1988)
that it is a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel to fail to provide him with an attorney other
than trial counsel to represent him in connection with
his appeal. Furthermore, based upon Pension v. Ohio,
supra, we conclude that such failure must be deemed to be
prejudicial per se.
The trial court record in the instant case clearly shows that
3

the defendant/appellant

requested

the appointment

counsel to represent him on appeal.

of different

Trial counsel, Quinn D.

Hunsaker, filed a Motion and Affidavit with the trial court on June
28,

1990.

(R.

377-388).

Paragraph

two

of

said

Motion

and

Affidavit states as follows:
2. That Mr. Cabututan has requested that I withdraw from
his case and that the Court appoint another attorney so
as to represent him in this matter.
The trial

court

pursuant to said Motion

issued

an Order

setting the matter for a hearing to be held on July 11, 1990.
(R.378).

Another

Order

was

issued,

providing

for

the

transportation of Defendant from the Utah State Prison to the Court
for the scheduled hearing. (R. 379).
The record further reflects that Defendant filed a pro se
affidavit, dated June 22, 1990 requesting the withdrawal of Mr.
Hunsaker as counsel. (R. 382).
The record at page 381 shows a Minute Entry which states as
follows:
The Defendant is present and represented by counsel.
Counsel for the State is also present as listed above.
The Defendant makes a request to represent himself on his
appeal to the Supreme Court, and requests that attorney
Hunsaker be dismissed as his counsel. The Court finds
and accepts request and allows the Defendant to represent
himself on said appeal. Attorney Hunsaker is to remain
counsel until he turns over any and all documents and
information which will assist the Defendant. Attorney
for the Defendant is to prepare the proper order for this
hearing.
The record in this case fails to reflect any proposed Order
prepared by appellate counsel in conformance with the Minute Entry
and in conformance with rulings made on July 11, 1990.
4

The record

further

fails to reflect any Order signed by the trial judge

requiring the withdrawal of attorney Hunsaker.

Attorney Hunsaker

remained on the case which, to all appearances, amounted to a
refusal on his part to withdraw.
for

the

transcript

It is also evident in his request

of proceedings

(R.

386-387)

that

attorney

Hunsaker also failed to include a request for a transcript of the
proceedings

held

in

the

trial

court

on

July

11,

1990.

Interestingly, the record fails to reveal any admonitions by the
court or counsel as to the perils of per se representation nor did
the court offer Defendant independent or additional counsel.

Of

further interest, counsel did not assign error to the trial court
for failure to act nor did he urge his inadequacy in failing to
press the issue..
The Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Johnson, 823 P2d 484,
487-488 (Utah App. 1991) held that Sixth Amendment right to counsel
guarantees

all

criminal

Defendants

the

right

to

effective

assistance of counsel, Templin, (infra) at 186, and "includes the
right [of Defendant] to counsel free from conflicts of interest".
The court Id at 489 further stated as follows:
Counsel's conduct may be examined in light of prevailing
professional and ethical standards to determine whether
Defendant received effective representation. Zepp, 748
F2d 135.
Rule 1.7(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct
states:
A
lawyer
shall not represent a client
if the
representation of that client may be materially limited
by... the lawyer's own interest, unless: (1) The lawyer
reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely affected; and (2) Each client consents after
consultation.
5

There was not only a conflict of interest in Mr. Hunsaker
raising and arguing his own ineffectiveness as trial counsel, but
his refusal, neglect or failure to withdraw deprived the Defendant
of his right to represent himself on appeal, State v. Penderville,
272 P2d 195

(Utah 1954) or the opportunity to seek substitute

appointed counsel.

State v. Zackuse, 833 P2d 142 (Mont. 1991);

State v. Browning, 824 P2d 170 (Idaho App. 1992).
Furthermore, referring to documents in the Addendum, it is
clear that during the pendency of this appeal, there was litigation
pending between the Defendant and attorney Hunsaker in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah; said litigation
actively persisting from February of 1992 to date.
Mr.

Hunsaker's

refusal or failure to withdraw as counsel

because of this conflict of interest raises the inference that
substitute counsel may have been precluded

from requesting the

Court for leave to file a substitute Brief of Appellant in lieu of
the brief filed by Mr. Hunsaker.

Furthermore, it may be inferred

that Defendant has been prejudiced by Mr. Hunsaker's representation
of him during oral arguments or by the waiver thereof
The

Defendant

respectfully

submits

that

the

by counsel.
per

se

rule

announced in State v. Brown, 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah 1992) which
addresses the similar problem of the part time role of defense
counsel as prosecutor should also apply to attorneys claiming and
arguing

on appeal

or

in post conviction

proceeding

their

own

ineffective assistance as trial counsel.
Mr. Hunsaker's performance as appellate counsel was further
6

deficient because of his failure to correct the inadequacies in the
transcripts of the trial court proceedings as provided under Rule
11(g) and Rule 11(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
State v. Menzies,

P. 2d

664 P.2d, 439 (Utah 1983).

, (Utah 1992) State v. Taylor,

Page 6 of the trial transcript shows

that the jury was selected, following which the court recessed for
lunch.

There is no transcript relating to the jury selection

process filed in this case.

The trial court issued an Order for a

full transcript of the trial proceedings at the expense of Box
Elder County.

(R.387).

Mr. Hunsaker's performance was deficient

in his failure to correct the inadequacies in the trial transcript
which was devoid of the jury selection process.

The lack of such

transcript raises questions as to whether there were any errors,
irregularities, or improprieties in the selection of the jury which
would

constitute

Defendant's

reversible

reservations

error,

(Defendant's

particularly
affidavit

in
in

light

of

support

of

motion for new trial) (Tr. 23 March 1990, p. 10-11).
There are other inadequacies in the transcript of the trial
proceedings.

On page 3 53 of the trial transcript the Court stated:

"The Court will note for the record that all previous motions made
by the defendant in previous hearings and at the beginning of this
trial (emphasis mine) are perpetuated." Again, Mr. Hunsaker failed
to correct the

inadequacies

of the trial transcript which

is

totally devoid of any proceedings relating to motions raised by the
defendant at the beginning of the trial.

Notwithstanding

the

court's statement, all in all, it is apparent that no transcripts
7

of Defendant's motion was presented in connection with Appellant's
brief.
the

Mr. Hunsaker's deficient performance as counsel deprived

defendant

of

his

Sixth

Amendment

right

to

the

Effective

assistance of counsel on appeal.
This case presents unique circumstances where the record is
clear as to the conflict of interest between the defendant and his
appointed attorney on appeal. Such conflict deprived the defendant
of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel
on appeal.

The defendant therefore

submits that the written

Opinion of this Court affirming part of his conviction should be
withdrawn and vacated.
1984).

This

defendant

was

State v. Elton, 680 P. 2d 727-728

withdrawal
deprived

would
of

be

his

ordered

Sixth

on

Amendment

the

(Utah

basis

right

that

to

the

effective assistance of counsel on appeal, the defendant submits
that a new Opinion then should be issued reversing the judgment of
the trial court and remanding the case to the trial court with
instructions

to

enter

a

new

appealable

judgment.

Stahl

v.

Commonwealth, 613 S.W.2d 617 (Kentucky 1981); Rodriguez v. United
States, 395 U.S. 327 (1969).
DISCUSSION OP POINT 2
2. The Court overlooked the inherent conflicts created by
appointed trial counsel raising and arguing, in a motion for a new
trial, the issue as to his own ineffective assistance as trial
counsel.
This Court in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990) held
that

a

properly

claim

of

ineffective

be raised

assistance

in a motion

of

trial

for a new trial.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
8

counsel

can

See also,

Defense

counsel

filed

a motion

for

a

new

trial

with

a

supporting affidavit of Raymond Phillip Cabututan in the trial
court. (R. 348-356) . Inter aliaf the defendant claimed that he was
entitled to a new trial because he was deprived of his Sixth
Amendment right to the effective assistance of trial counsel.
The

defendant

claimed

under

paragraph

number

six of his

affidavit that his attorney, Mr. Hunsaker, did not adequately
cross-examine prosecution witnesses.

(R. 353).

This claim, if

established by competent argument, could constitute a denial of the
effective assistance of counsel. People v. Skinner, 581 N.E.2d 252
(111. App. 1 Dist. 1991).
The defendant claimed under paragraph number seven of his
affidavit

that his attorney, Mr. Hunsaker

prepare for his case.

did

not

adequately

(R. 353). This claim, if established

by competent argument, could constitute a denial of the effective
assistance of counsel.
The defendant

State v. Templin, (supra).

claimed under paragraph

number

ten of his

affidavit that his attorney, Mr. Hunsaker did not adequately crossexamine Richard Anderson and failed to place crucial evidence into
the trial record.

This claim if established could constitute a

denial of the effective assistance of Counsel.

People v. Skinner,

581 N.E.2d 252 (111. App. 1 Dist. 1991); Fernandez v. Cook, 783
P.2d 547 (Utah 1989).
There are other issues such as Mr. Hunsaker's failure to
timely file a Motion for the Court to appoint a Psychiatrist,

This

claim, if established by competent arugument, could constitute a
9

denial of the effective assistance of counsel.

United States v.

Gholston, 932 F.2d 904, 905 (11th Cir. 1991).
The attorney who presented and argued the defendant's claim of
the ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the motion for a new
trial was Quinn Hunsaker who was placed in the unenviable position
of claiming and arguing his own ineffective assistance as trial
counsel.
Defendant

contends that the

same standards which

prevent

counsel from claiming or arguing on direct appeal or in postconviction relief, his own ineffective assistance as trial counsel,
should also be applied in motions for a new trial.
The conflict of interest between the defendant and his trial
attorney deprived the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to the
effective assistance of counsel in his motion for a new trial and
at the hearing held on the motion for a new trial.
may

account

for the deficient performance

Such conflict

of Mr. Hunsaker

in

advancing such claim at the hearing held on said motion for a new
trial on March 23, 1990.

(March 23, 1990 Hearing Tr. 3-19).

As

briefed, argued and presented, the motion for a new trial ignored
the real factual and legal basis for ineffective assistance that
was contended by the Defendant.

The Defendant was, as a matter of

law and as a matter of fact, deprived of his Sixth Amendment right
to the effective assistance of counsel in the presentation of
defendant's motion for a new trial.

The Court can presume the

deprivation to be based in the conflict
counsel.
10

visited on Defendant's

DISCUSSION OF POINT 3
3. The Court overlooked appellate counsel's failure to comply
with the guidelines and requirements in submitting a purported
Anders brief.
Mr. Hunsaker, in submitting what purports to be an Anders
brief

(Appellant's

brief

p.

45) , failed

to

comply

with

the

requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) in that
he failed to advise the Court that he believed the appeal to be
wholly frivolous and to request that he be permitted to withdraw
from the case.

State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (1981); State v.

Flores, 214 Utah Adv. Rep. 48-49 (Utah App. 1993).
Mr.

Hunsaker

under

Point

V

of

the

Argument,

(Brief

of

Appellant, page 45) states that counsel submits the argument,
pursuant to Defendant's wishes, and under the Rules pursuant to
Anders v. California, supra, that Defendant was denied a fair trial
due to biased opinions against him based upon his race.
There are other indications that the Brief submitted by Mr.
Hunsaker was an Anders brief • This can best be demonstrated by the
text of the Brief of Appellee.
At page 13 of the Brief of Appellee, counsel states that
Defendant alleges, without providing legal analysis or authority,
that the trial court abused its discretion in not permitting the
jury to view the crime scene.
At page 15 of the Brief of Appellee, counsel states that on
appeal, defendant does not demonstrate why the court's decision
prejudiced him, but concludes, without record citation or support,
that

eyewitness

identification

was
11

inadequate

and

testimony

inconsistent.
At page 16 of the Brief of Appellee, Counsel states that
because defendant has not supported his argument with citation or
legal analysis and because it is not supported by the record these
contentions should be rejected.
At page 23 of the Brief of Appellee, Counsel states that
regarding the issue of prosecutorial misconduct Defendant has both
failed

to

properly

preserve

and

to

substantively

argue

his

allegations, and his claims should be rejected.
At pages 23-24 of the Brief of Appellee, counsel states that
Defendant has failed throughout to offer any evidence supporting
his allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and has not properly
preserved the issue for appellate review.
It would appear from these numerous statements and comments in
the Brief

of Appellee that the Brief of Appellant

lacked

any

substantive argument; lacked any legal analysis; lacked any factual
arguments; and lacked any citations to the record and evidence to
support any argument.

These arguments of Appellee appear to have

considerable merit.
These contentions and a review of the Brief of Appellant
suggests that the brief, in that it was submitted as an Anders
brief, must comply with this Court's requirements in State v.
Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981).
brief

This case held that an Anders

in Utah must contain a Statement of Facts and Argument

containing any issues with supporting authority.
counsel, Mr. Hunsaker, therefore,
12

failed

to

Appellants prior
comply

with

that

requirement in that he failed to advise the Court that he believed
the appeal was wholly frivolous, he move the Court to permit his
withdrawal from the case, nor did he demontrate to the Court that
the appeal is frivolous.
DISCUSSION OF POINT 4
Point 4.

It is vital to a fair consideration of Defendant's

subsequent judicial proceedings that these errors be corrected by
this Court.

If they are not, the issues raised on appeal could be

subsequently barred by res judicata, State v. Wareham, 801 P2d
(Utah 1990); Candelario v. Cook, 789 P2d 710 (Utah 1990); and the
Federal Courts will give deference to this Court's finding, if they
are the findings of a majority of the Court.

Sumner v. Mata, 449

U.S. 539 (1981).
DISCUSSION OF POINT 5
In the hearing held in Box Elder County on 11 June 1993, upon
remand from this court, the presiding judge read the opinion as
limiting Defendant to the issues pressed in his original motion for
a new trial (transcript pending) and indeed seemed to limit new
counsel to the arguments advanced by Defendant's prior counsel.
Defendant contends that new counsel should not, by this court's
opinion, if

it so holds, be fettered

by the bounds of prior

counsels ingenuity or industry.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant respectfully submits that the Opinion issued by
the Court affirming part of his conviction should be withdrawn and
vacated.

The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and
13

the case remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter a
new appealable judgment.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this

A.
Attorney fo

14

1993.

CERTIFICATE OP COUNSEL
Counsel certifies that this petition is submitted in good
faith and not for the purpose of delay.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies of
the foregoing Petition for Rehearing, postage prepaid, to the
following listed below on this

Jan Graham
Utah Attorney General
Judith S.H. Atherton
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

\^ —day of July, 1993.

A D D E N D U M

BRIGHAM DISTRICT

I
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Quinn D. Hunsaker #4058
Attorney at Law
102 South First West
P.O. Box 461
Brigham City, Utah 84302
(801) 723-8569
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Plaintiff,
vs .
RAYMOND PHILLIP CABUTUTAN,

CIVIL NO. 891000060FS

Defendant.
COMES NOW the Defendant, Raymond Phillip Cabututan, by and
through his attorney, Quinn D. Hunsaker, pursuant to the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure and hereby makes his Motion for a New
Trial to be held in the above-captioned matter.
FACTS

1.
On January 3, 1990, the Defendant with h i s a t t o r n e y
appeared before the F i r s t Judicial D i s t r i c t Court, Honorable F. L.
Gunnell p r e s i d i n g . At t h a t t i m e , the newly promulgated court
r u l e s of the F i r s t - Judicial D i s t r i c t were in e f f e c t , and
Defendant's counsel expected to follow that procedure.
However,
t h e Court did not allow for discovery time or a p r e - t r i a l
conference between the Defendant and the County Attorney's office,
b u t s e t the m a t t e r for t r i a l to begin on January 22, 1990.
Counsel objected, however, the Court indicated t h a t t r i a l would

MAR

2 1990

proceed at that time.
2.

That on or about January

18, 1990, counsel appeared

before the Court to argue several motions, including a Motion for
Continuance.
counsel

The Motion for Continuance was denied

indicated

although

further time was necessary to prepare for the

trial.
3.

That prior to trial, counsel determined that it was

necessary to have an alcohol expert testify both to the level of
alcohol that the Defendant had, and to the effects of alcohol upon
the Defendant i.e. whether or not the Defendant had the necessary
state of mind to form the intent required to be guilty of Second
Degree Murder.
4.

That prior to the trial, Defendant's counsel discussed

with Defendant the need for further discovery, as well as the
necessity of the other Defendants being called to testify in the
matter.
5.

That on January 22, 1990, trial of the above-entitled

matter commenced, with the Defendant preserving his earlier Motion
for

Continuance

with

the

Court

and with other motions

made

previously.
6.

That at the trial, counsel for the Defendant attempted to

call as witnesses the three co-defendants in this matter, but the
Court refused to have them called as witnesses in this matter.
7.

That at the trial, during the selection of the jury, the

Defendant noted that he felt that certain racial remarks were made
against him by perspective jury members, as well as the jury panel
not being

representative of his peers i.e., no minorities were

placed on the jury.
8.

That during the trial, the Defendant testified to his

intoxication, but the Court would not allow expert testimony to
base an opinion upon the level that the Defendant was at during
the incident that occurred.
9.
That the jury was kept in a small room, throughout the
entire day on Friday, until the jury instructions were completed.

The

jury

was not supervised

informed

at that

time, and Defendant

is

and believes that the jury discussed the case and made

its decision prior to being instructed by the Court regarding the
law.
10.

That the jury found the Defendant guilty of Second

Degree Murder, guilty of Aggravated Assault and guilty of a Class
B Misdemeanor, threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in a
fight or quarrel.
11.
in

That at the trial, the weapon claimed to have been used

the Aggravated

Assault was not produced, thus depriving the

jury of noting whether or not it was truly a dangerous weapon.
12.

That at the trial, counsel attempted to use the private

investigator to demonstrate the inability of witnesses to use
certain

aspects

of

the

incident

that

they

claimed

to

have

perceived, but said private investigator was unable to convey such
detail.

Previously, the Court, without noting any of the evidence

or testimony, specifically ruled out having the jury view the
crime scene.
13.

Subsequent

to Defendant's trial, each of the three

co-defendants testified"at trial, which testimony the Defendant is
informed

and

believes

is

exculpatory

to

the

Defendant,

and

Defendant attempted but could not procure their testimony or
presence at his first trial.
14.

That at Defendant's trial, and its subsequent trials, a

eye witness, Richard Anderson, testified and contradicted himself
on key points testimony, but the prosecuting attorney allowed such
testimony that the Defendant is informed and believes is perjury
but was allowed both by the Court and by the County Attorney.
ARGUMENT
Utah

Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 24 allows for a new

trial in the interest of justice.
The basis for a new trial in this matter is multi-f auceted,
and is allowable by the Court.

-3-

In this matter, the Defendant

was deprived of the testimony of three eye witnesses, i.e., the
three

co-defendants, which

testimony

the

Defendant believes is

exculpatory to him.
Additionally, the Defendant believes the Court was arbritrary
and capricious in denying the motion for the jury to view the
crime scene; to disallow testimony by the alcohol expert; to
disallow

the retaining of

regarding

the Defendant's

required

under a second degree murder charge; to disallow a

continuance;

to

require

an expert psychiatrist

to testify

inability to form the specific
the

jury

to

sit

intent

unsupervised

all

throughout Friday, thus allowing, as the Defendant is informed and
believes, for the jury to make their decision prior to the Court
rendering to the jury the jury instructions.
Based upon the foregoing and good cause appearing therefore,
Defendant respectfully requests that the Court grant the Defendant
a new trial in the above-entitled matter.
Dated this ^ ^ — ' day of March, 1990
pjM,

h^\j

Jnn W.' Hunsaker
Attorney at Law

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document to:

Mr. Roger F. Baron, Deputy Box Elder

Attorney, 45 North 100 East, Brigham City, Utatj/84302.
Dated this

day of March, 1990.

BRIGHAM DISTRICT

Quinn D. Hunsaker #4058
Attorney at Law
102 South First West
P.O. Box 461
Brigham City, Utah 84302
(801)
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF RAYMOND PHILLIP
CABUTUTAN

vs
RAYMOND PHILLIP CABUTUTAN,

CIVIL NO. 891000060FS

Defendant•
STATE OF UTAH

)

: ss .
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER
I, Raymond Phillip Cabututan, being first duly sworn depose
and say:
1. That I am the Defendant in the above-entitled matter, and
do hereby make and publish this Affidavit in support of any motion
for new trial or appeal that my attorney may present.
2. That it is my firm and just belief that I did not receive
a fair trial in the First Judicial District Court, and that I am
entitled to a new trial.
3 . That I do not believe I received a fair trial due to the
fact that the Court allowed less than thirty (30) days preparation
for trial, and the Court would not grant any continuance as
requested by myself or my attorney on my behalf*
4.
That I believe that the jury was biased because I am a
minority, and because they claimed I am a transient. I pointed

MAR

2 1990

out to my attorney that there were no minorities on the jury, but
my attorney did not object as I asked him to so as to allow other
minorities to be placed on the jury panel.
5.

That

publicity

it is my firm belief that there was way too much

as all of

the

jury

panel

was

aware

of the

false

accusations against me, which I believe made them biased against
me and did

not allow for a fair trial solely upon the

facts

presented at trial.
6.

I believe that I was denied effective assistance of

counsel due to the fact that the Court did not allow a continuance
as requested by my attorney, and further that my attorney did not
cross-examine
specifically

witnesses

in

the

asked my attorney

way

in

which

I

to cross-examine

asked.

I

each of the

witnesses on each particular point that they had contradicted
themselves on in earlier testimony, but my attorney did not do as
I requested.
7.

I do not believe I received a fair trial and effective

assistance of counsel due to the fact that my attorney did not
properly prepare my case.

It is my belief that he left out vital

evidence that would have proved my innocence, including statements
made by myself on the day after my arrest in regards to self
defense claims and other particular points of my defense.
8.

That on January 22, 1990, the day my trial commenced, my

attorney told me he was not properly prepared for a case such as
this, and

I believe

that denied

me effective

assistance

of

counsel.
9.

I believe I was denied a fair trial in that one of the

witnesses, Richard
stating

Anderson, clearly

perjured

himself by first

that he had not left the trailer, but later indicating

that he had left the trailer once Eric Tilley had testified that
Richard Anderson's statement was false.

I further believe that

there was misconduct by the fact that Richard Anderson was told of
Eric Tilley's testimony outside of the courtroom by Detective Dale
Ward,

another witness, which clearly violated

Rule placed upon all witnesses at my trial.
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the

Exclusionary

10.

My attorney told me that the State's offices had warned

Richard

Anderson that Eric Tilley had testified that Richard

Anderson's statement about leaving the trailer was false, but I do
not believe that my attorney entered that in the court record or
properly cross-examined

Richard Anderson on that matter, thereby

denying me effective assistance of counsel.
11.

I believe that the Prosecuting Attorney knew of the

conflicting statements and false accusations of Richard Anderson,
but

allowed

such perjury to enter the case without

properly

protecting my rights to a fair trial, and his duty to make sure
that no perjury was entered in my case.
12.

I believe that I am entitled to a new trial due to the

testimony presented by the three other co-defendants, William
Cummins, Don Brown and

Billy Cayer, which

testimony

clearly

supported my continued claims of self-defense.
13.

I believe that the Court errored in allowing the jury to

sit all day on Friday in a small room, thereby deciding my case
before the jury was properly instructed by the Court.
14.

I specifically requested that my attorney force the

Court to make some issue of the failure of Sherman Galardo to be
present at trial, but the Court denied any such information to the
jury which I believe would have helped influence their decision.
15.

I believe I did not receive a fair trial due to the fact

that the Court refused to allow the jury to view the scene, which
would have effectively showed that Richard Anderson could not have
seen what he claimed he saw, as well as giving them an idea of how
small the trailers actually were which was not effectively done
either by testimony or pictures.

I believe that the Judge was

prejudiced against me by the reason that he denied the Motion for
the jury to view the scene even before testimony had been heard,
showing that he did not care whether or not I received a fair
trial.
16.
and

Additionally, I specifically requested to my attorney

Private Investigator that pictures be taken during right

conditions at the camp so that the jury would be able to know that

-3-

Richard Anderson and the other witnesses could not see what they
claimed they saw due to the limited visibility at the camp during
the night, which was that no one could see hardly anything unless
it was directly in the light.
Because this was not done, I
believe I was denied effective assistance of counsel, and further,
that the Judge erred in not letting the jury go to the scene at
the camp,
17.

I believe I did not receive a fair trial when the Court

referred to allow either alcohol testimony or allowing my attorney
to retain a psychiatrist to be able to testify on whether or not I
had the specific intent to endanger the life of Miquel Rameriz due
to my consumption of alcohol.
18.
failed

I believe that I was denied a fair trial when the State
to produce the sharpening stone which was claimed to be

part of the aggravated assault on Eric Apodaca.

Because this was

not produced, the jury did not know if the stone really was a
dangerous weapon or not, and the stone should have been at trial.
I hereby request that the Court grant a new trial based upon
the above-stated reasons.
Dated this

cP<^ ~ day of February, 1990.

Raymond Phillip Cabututan
Subscribed
February, 1990

and sworn to before me this £<r "~~ day of

£2ZL
Notary Public
R e s i d i n g a t : f£&fffff??/V*lf
(Jn+rf
My Commission E x p i r e s : £&/9T /£, '9*?/
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Quinn D. Hunsaker #4058
Attorney at Law
102 South First West
P.O. Box 461
Brigham City, Utah 84302
(801) 723-8569
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RAYMOND PHILLIP CABUTUTAN,
Defendant.

) MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT OF
QUINN D. HUNSAKER
)
)
CIVIL NO. _&9£0OfrStJFS-

]

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF BOX ELDER

: ss.
)

^icoooko

I, Quinn D. Hunsaker, being first duly sworn depose and say:
1. That I am the court appointed attorney for Raymond
Phillip Cabututan in the above-entitled matter, and if called as a
witness, can testify competently thereto,
2. That Mr. Cabututan has requested that I withdraw from his
case and that the Court appoint another attorney so as to
represent him in this matter,
3. That I know of no conflict that exists other than the
fact that the Defendant feels that his interests would be better
represented by other counsel on appeal, and therefore under the
circumstances I believe that I am no longer able to effectively
represent Mr. Cabututan and therefore Mr. Cabututan should be
represented by other counsel in this matter.
Case »\'o.

J M 2 9 1990

^

WHEREFORE, counsel respectively requests the Court set a time
and date in the above-entitled matter, and that the Defendant,
Raymond Phillip Cabututan, and at such hearing be appointed other
counsel to represent him on appeal on this matter.
DATED this 1$&* day of June, 1908^ S \
Quihn D. Hunsaker
Attorney at Law
i
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, and good cause appearing therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, Raymond Phillip
Cabututan, shall appear before the above-entitled Court on the
11th day of July, 1990, at the hour of 1:30 p.m., and there
present to the Court his Motion for appointment of counsel for
representation on appeal.
DATED this 2\ °l day of June, 1990.

4*t*t~**r^ *JL£_
L. Gunnell
District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to: Raymond Phillip Cabututan, 14000 South
Frontage Road, Draper, Utah 84020; Mr. Roger F. Baron, Deputy Box
Elder Attorney, 45 North 100 East, Brigham City, Utah 84302; Paul
Van Dam, Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Bldg., Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114.
Dated t h i s , ^ day of 'U'.?-/ ^

1990.

3M retary
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BWGHMt DISTRICT

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRIC

RT, IN AND FOR

BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
REQUEST AND ORDER OF
TRANSPORTATION

Plaintiff,
vs .
Raymond Phillip Cabututan

Criminal No. A9-U3^W^>F-S-

YllCOdOhO

Defendant.

COMES NOW, Quinn D. Hunsaker, attorney for the Defendant,
Raymond Phillip Cabututan, and hereby requests an Order for the
Transportation of the Defendant from the Utah State Prison to the
above-entitled Court for the matter set on the 11th day of July,
1990 at 1:30 p.m.
DATED this ffi day of *\ UJ^j^
, 1990.

Attorney for the Defendant
ORDER
TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named Defendant shall be
transported by you from the Utah State Prison to the
above-entitled Court at the hearing set on the 11th day of July,
1990 at 1:30 p.m.
DATED this c?^7 day of ,M ji^Zj
1990.

District Judge

JUN 2 9 1990

"

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
STATE OF UTAH
PLAINTIFF
VS
CABUTUTAN, RAYMOND PHILLIP
DEFENDANT

CASE NUMBER 891000060 FS
DATE 07/11/90
HONORABLE F. L. GUNNELL
COURT REPORTER FELSHAW, RODNEY
COURT CLERK SLH

TYPE OF HEARING:
HEARING
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT
P. ATTY. BUNDERSON, JON J
D. ATTY. HUNSAKER, QUINN D

THE DEFENDANT IS PRESENT AND REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. COUNSEL FOR
THE STATE IS ALSO PRESENT AS LISTED ABOVE. THE DEFENDANT MAKES
A REQUEST TO REPRESENT HIMSELF ON HIS APPEAL TO THE SUPREME
COURT, AND REQUESTS THAT ATTORNEY HUNSAKER BE DISMISSED AS HIS
COUNSEL. THE COURT FINDS AND ACCEPTS REQUEST AND ALLOWS THE
DEFENDANT TO REPRESENT HIMSELF ON SAID APPEAL. ATTORNEY HUNSAKER
IS TO REMAIN COUNSEL UNTIL HE TURNS OVER ANY AND ALL DOCUMENTS
AND INFORMATION WHICH WILL ASSIST THE DEFENDANT. ATTORNEY FOR
THE DEFENDANT IS TO PREPARE THE PROPER ORDER FOR THIS HEARING.

I RAYMOND rnlLLH- CAflUTUTnw
rfould put in a motion for relief of counsul
In the First Dmaicia;. Court
in ana for Box Llder County Sate of Utha
On the facts of
Misrepresentation
Conflict of enterest
*nd Insaificent Counsul
And woula ask that all eviaance f Transcripts of hearings
and trials of mine and the*i*£rdefendants be turned over
to ne
So I may fight my ov<n case
Rut i would also reserve the right to obtian counsul
My attorney is Quin Hunsaker #^C58
Attorney at law 102 South First Vrfest
P.O Box ^61
3righan uity Utah 6^302

Case

No.^LC^£^/

JUL 1 > 1990

BRIGHAU DISTRJC"

Quinn D. Hunsaker #4058
Attorney at Law
102 South First West
P.O. Box 461
Brigham City, Utah 84302
(801) 723-8569

QcrlS

IQ 55 AiJ f 90

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPTS
OF PROCEEDINGS

vs
RAYMOND PHILLIP CABUTUTAN,
Defendant.

CIVIL NO- 891000060FS

COMES NOW the Defendant, Raymond Phillip Cabututan, by and
thorough his attorney, Quinn D. Hunsaker, and hereby request that
the transcript of the trial of State of Utah vs. Raymond Phillip
Cabututan, held on January 22, 1990 through January 26, 1990, held
in the above-entitled Court be prepared and submitted to the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah as part of the Defendant's
appeal of the judgment and conviction after trial.
Said
transcript is to be prepared at the expense of Box Elder County
pursuant to previous evidence submitted to the Court as to the
Defendant being impecunious.

£*L

DATED this//

day of

, 1990.

Quihn D. Hunsaker
Attorney at Law
lOt South 100 West
P. 0. Box 461
Brigham City, Utah 84302

Case No.22&2222££
OCT ) 6 1991
*,

ORDER FOR TRANSCRIPT
Based upon the foregoing, and good cause appearing therefore,
and the Court having previously considered the impecuniousity of
the Defendant, Raymond Phillip Cabututan, and the Court being
fully advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the transcript of the trial of
State of Utah vs. Raymond Phillip Cabututan as described above in
the

request made by the Defendant, shall be prepared at the

expense of Box Elder County.
DATED this //,- day of

±-

, 1990.

r //

F. L. Gunnell
District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to:

Jon J. Bunderson, Box Elder County

Attorney, 45 North 100 East, Brigham City, Utah 84302; R. Paul
VanDam, Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114.
DATED this /^T^day of

$CKQ&V

1990.

inn D. Hunsaker
torney at Law
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT QF BOX* ELDE* COUNT1
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF,
VS.
RAYMOND PHILLIP CABUTUTAN,
DEFENDANT.

>
>
>
>
)
)
)
>

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
CASE NO. 831000060

BE IT REMEMBERED THAT THIS MATTER CAME ON REGULARLY
FOR HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE F.L. GUNNELL, JUDGE,
SITTING WITH A JURY AT BRIGHAM CITY, UTAH ON THE 32^0,

23RD.

24TH, 25TH, AND 26TH DAYS OF JANUARY 1990.
WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT:
•*•*•* •*•*

APPEARANCES:
FOR THE STATE:

ROGER F. BARON

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

QUINN D. HUNSAKER
**.*•*•*

REPORTED BY DEAN OLSEN
347 E. 2800 N.
NORTH OGDEN, UTAH 84414
WK. 451-3271 HM. 782-3148

NOV 2 9 1990

_100>I

Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah

Case No

_\

\'ften& u

/ \tr

r,/i

353
1

T H A T T H E J U R Y IS P R E S E N T IN T H E JURY BOX.

2

PRESENT AS COUNSEL.

3

T H E R E C O R D T H A T A L L P R E V I O U S M O T I O N S M A D E BY T H E D E F E N D A N T IN.

4

P R E V I O U S H E A R I N G S A N D AT J H g B E G I N N I N G OF THIS T R I A L A R E

5

PERPETUATED.

STATE'S PRESENT.

T H E D E F E N D A N T IS

THE COURT WILL NOTE FOR

6

MR. H U N S A K E R :

THANK Y O U , YOUR

7

THE COURT:

Y O U MAY P R O C E E D , MR. HUNSAKER.

8

MR. H U N S A K E R :

W E ' L L CALL T H E F I R S T WITNESS, J O S E P H L Y N N

9

YEATES.

10
H

HONOR.

THE COURT:
YOUR PREVIOUS

12

I R E M I N D Y O U Y O U ' R E STILL UNDER O A T H F R O M

TESTIMONY.

THE WITNESS:

Y E S , YOUR

13

HONOR.

LYNN YEATES,

14

P R E V I O U S L Y C A L L E D A S A W I T N E S S , WAS AGAIN

15

EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

16

RECRQSS-EXAMINATIQN

17

B Y MR. H U N S A K E R :

18

Q

19

SHERIFF'S OFFICE,

20

EVIDENCE CUSTODIAN,

21

A

THAT'S CORRECT.

22

Q

S O IN O T H E R WORDS, A L L T H I S S T U F F THAT I P L A C E D O U T H E R E

23

YESTERDAY,

24

T H E T I M E T H A T I T ' S S E I Z E D U N T I L WE C O M E TO TRIAL L I K E T H I S ?

25

UNLESS

NOW, S E R G E A N T Y E A T E S ,

IN R E G A R D S TO YOUR D U T I E S A T T H E

IT'S MY U N D E R S T A N D I N G T H A T YOU A R E T H E
IS T H A T

CORRECT?

Y O U ' R E T H E P E R S O N T H A T T A K E S C H A R G E OF T H A T FROM

IT'S T A K E N A N D T E S T E D S O M E P L A C E E L S E ?

1

THE COURT:

THE RECORD SHOULD REFLECT THAT THE

2

DEFENDANT IS PRESENT IN COURT REPRESENTED BY HIS CLIENT.

3

THE —

4

ME, REPRESENTED BY MP. HUNSAKER, CORRECT?

THAT THE STATE IS PRESENT WITH MR. ROGER BARON.

5

MR. HUNSAKER:

THAT'S CORRECT. YOUR HONOR.

6

THE COURT;

AMD THE STATE'S REPRESENTED BY MP.

7

BARON.

AND
EXCUSE

ARE YOU READY TO PROCEED, GENTLEMEN"'

8

MR. BARON:

STATE IS READY, YOUR HONOR.

9

THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT. IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING THAT

10 YOU'RE READY AS WELL, MR. HUNSAKER, IS THAT CORRECT?
11

MR. HUNSAKER:

UNDER THE PREVIOUS DECISION, YOUR HONOR,

12 WE' RE READY TO PROCEED.
13
14

THE COURT:

ALL RIGHT.

THANK YOU.

IT'S MY

UNDERSTANDING ALSO THAT THE CLERK HAS SWORN THE JURY PANEL, IS

15 THAT ALSO CORRECT?
16

THE CLERK:

YES, YOUR HONOR.

17

THE COURT:

AND INSTRUCTED THEM AS TO THE PROCEDURES

18 THAT WE'RE GOING TO FOLLOW AT- THIS POINT, IS THAT CORRECT?
19

THE CLERK:

YES, YOUR HONOR.

20

THE COURT:

OKAY.

WOULD THE CLERK NOW DRAW THE JURY?

21

(WHEREUPON THE JURY WAS SELECTED, FOLLOWING

22

WHICH THE COURT RECESSED FOR LUNCH.)

23

THE COURT:

THE RECORD SHOULD REFLECT THE DEFENDANT

24

IS PRESENT AS ARE COUNSEL FOR BOTH SIDES.

25

REQUEST MADE IN CHAMBERS FOR THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE, SO

THERE'S BEEN A

MAG
U.S. District Court
District of Utah (Central)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 92-CV-136
abututan v. Hunsaker
Filed: 02/12/92
ssigned to: Chief Judge Bruce S. Jenkins
Jury demand: Plaintiff
Referred to: Judge Ronald N. Boyce
smand: $0,000
Nature of Suit: 550
sad Docket: None
Jurisdiction: Federal Question
let # in 10th Circuit : is 92-4086
ause: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights
\YM0ND P. CABUTUTAN
plaintiff

Raymond P. Cabututan
[COR LD NTC] [PRO SE]
Utah State Prison

cues
P.O. Box 550
Gunnison, UT 84634
v.
JINN D. HUNSAKER
defendant

>cket as of July 2, 1993 12:46 pm
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Proceedings include all events.
>:92cvl36
Cabututan v. Hunsaker

MAG

1/12/92

1

Motion by Raymond P. Cabututan to proceed in forma
pauperis and order (bn) [Entry date 02/13/92]

2/12/92

2

Complaint filed, assigned to Judge BSJ.
(bn) [Entry date 02/13/92]

2/12/92

3

Demand for jury trial by Raymond P. Cabututan (mw)
[Entry date 02/13/92]

2/12/92

4

Motion by Raymond P. Cabututan for appointment of counsel

Receipt #: ifp

(mw) [Entry date 02/13/92]
2/14/92

5

Order of Reference 28:636 blB

2/14/92
3/2 0/92

—
6

Case referred to Judge Ronald N. Boyce (mw)
Report and Recommendations of Judge Ronald N. Boyce,
recommending that the complaint be dismissed . Objections
to R and R due by 4/2/92 (kj) [Entry date 03/23/92]

4/7/92

7

Objections by Raymond P. Cabututan, Quinn D. Hunsaker to
[6-1] report and recommendations (mw) [Entry date 04/08/92]

4/21/92

8

Order, adopting R&R, dismissing complt, allowing pltf
lv to file amended complaint due on 5/5/92 signed by BSJ
(mw)

5/5/92

9

Judgment for Quinn D. Hunsaker against Raymond P.
Cabututan signed by Chief Deputy Clerk (mw)

5/5/92

—

Case closed (mw)

6/4/92

10

Notice of appeal by Raymond P. Cabututan appealing from
judgment 5/5/92 ; Fee Status: ifp (lynn)
[Entry date 06/08/92]

6/8/92

11

Notice of appeal and certified copy of docket to USCA:
[10-1] appeal packets to cnsl (lynn)

6/8/92

12

Designation by Raymond P. Cabututan
(lynn)

6/24/92

13

Certified and transmitted record on appeal to U.S. Court of
Appeals consisting of Vol I pleadings # 2, 6-10 Re: [10-1]
appeal (lynn)

7/1/92

14

No Transcript requested [10-1] appeal (lynn)

3/24/93

15

Order of Reference 28:636 blB

Docket as of July 2,

1993 12:46 pm

signed by BSJ (mw)

of record on appeal

signed by BSJ (mw)

Page 2

•oceedings include all events.
92cvl36
Cabututan v. Hunsaker

MAG

25/93

16

Certified copy of mandate from USCA Re: [10-1] appeal
remanding to the Dist Crt to reconsider its dismissal of
the appellant's section 1983 claims in light of this
opinion. In all other respects the Dist Crt's order is
affirmed, (lynn)

25/93

—

Case reopened (mw)
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT

United States Cot: --i of Appealr
Tenth Circuit

MAR 0 1 1993

ROBERT L. HOECKER
Clerk
RAYMOND P. CABUTTJTAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 92-4086
(D. Utah No. 92-CV-136)

v.
QUINN D. HUNSAKER,
Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT1
Before LOGAN, CircuityJudge, BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge, and
EBEL, Circuit Judge **
This case comes before us on the district court's 28 U.S.C.
§1915 (d) dismissal of the appellant's civil rights claims under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1981, 1985(3) and 1986.1

We affirm the

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not
be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except
for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case,
res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel
has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially
assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P.
34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered
submitted without oral argument.
Subsequent to the filing of this appeal, the appellant has
filed in this court a Motion for Voluntary Dismissal. He requests
that we dismiss his claim without prejudice, representing that the
defendant, Quinn Hunsaker, was found dead sometime between January
14th and January 22, 1993. He seeks dismissal without prejudice
so that he can file a subsequent complaint with his coconspirators
in the underlying case.
The appellant's motion is denied. In its dismissal of the
complaint under § 1915 (d), the lower court reached the merits of

district court's order as to the appellant's Section 1981, 1985(3)
and 1986 claims but remand for further proceedings with respect to
the appellant's Section 1983 claim.
On October 26, 1989, the appellant, Raymond P. Cabututan, was
arrested and charged with second degree murder, aggravated
assault, and threatening or using a dangerous weapon in a fight or
quarrel.

The appellee, Quinn D. Hunsaker, acted as a public

defender and represented the appellant at trial in Box Elder
County, Utah.

The appellant was convicted and is currently

incarcerated at the Utah Central Correctional Facility in
Gunnison, Utah.
On February 12, 1992, the appellant filed this pro se civil
rights action in the United States District Court for the District
of Utah.

He alleges that the appellee violated his constitutional

2
rights in the course of representing him at trial.

The district

the appellant's claims and therefore, as the case comes before us,
dismissal of the complaint without prejudice is inappropriate.
Furthermore, the case is not rendered moot by the death of the
defendant as his estate may still be liable for any constitutional
violations. Accordingly, we remand to the district court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. However, we
note for the appellant's instruction that upon remand the merits
of his claims are reopened and the district court may at that time
entertain a motion to dismiss without prejudice should the
appellant choose to renew his motion there to dismiss his
complaint.
2
Among the appellants claims are that the appellee failed to:
request a venue change in light of pretrial publicity, request a
new jury after he was informed of prejudicial remarks made by some
jurors, impeach or object to the testimony of contradictory
eyewitnesses, object to violations of the exclusionary rule, keep
out perjured testimony, move for a racially balanced jury, or move
for a new trial. In addition, the appellant claims the appellee
was "related through marriage" to the state's attorney,
represented some of the jurors as a private attorney, refused to
argue self-defense as the appellant requested, and incompetently
directed his appeal.
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court referred the action to a magistrate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B).

The magistrate issued a Report and Recommendation

on March 20, 1992, advising that the complaint should be dismissed
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

The appellant subsequently filed

objections to the magistrate's report.

The district court adopted

the magistrate's Report and Recommendation in full on April 21,
1992.
Under 28 U.S.C. §1915 (d), a claim is to be dismissed only if
it is found to be "frivolous or malicious."

We review the

dismissal of an action under 28 U.S.C. §1915 (d) for an abuse of
discretion.
1991).

LaFevers v. Saffle, 936 F.2d 1117, 1118 (10th Cir.

"Whenever a plaintiff states an arguable claim for relief,

dismissal for frivolousness under §1915(d) is improper, even if
the legal basis underlying the claim is incorrect."

McKinney v.

Oklahoma, 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir. 1991). 4

I. The Claims Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(3) and 1986
The district court properly dismissed the appellant's claims
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985(3) and 1986.

The appellant failed

to allege any racial or class based discriminatory animus as

28 U.S.C. § 1915 provides with respect to in forma pauperis
proceedings that "[t]he court . . . may dismiss the case if
satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious."
4
The appellant appears before us pro se and accordingly we
construe his pleadings liberally. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9
(1980); Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1526 (10th Cir. 1988).
-3-

required by §1981,

General Building Contractors v. Pennsylvania,

458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982) (cited in Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d
1240, 1250 (10th Cir. 1992)), and §1985(3), Griffen v.
Breckenridae. 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).6

In addition, the

appellant's §1986 claim was correctly dismissed because there can
be no liability for failing to prevent a civil rights conspiracy
under §19 86 where there is no valid claim of conspiracy under
§1985(3).

Taylor v. Nichols, 558 F.2d 561, 568 (10th Cir. 1977).

II. The Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The magistrate recommended, and the district court ordered,
the dismissal of the appellant's §1983 claims because they
concluded that "[a]n attorney acting as a public defender in a
criminal case does not act under color of state law within the
meaning of 42 U.S.C. §1983."

The magistrate cited Polk County v.

Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) and Brown v. Chaffee, 612 F.2d 497
(10th Cir. 1979).

While this statement of the law is generally

Further, as the magistrate noted, the appellee's actions that
form the basis of the appellant's claims were not prohibited by
§1981. Section 1981 guarantees to all citizens the equal right
"to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence,
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens." Appellant here did not allege actions violative of
these proscriptions.
g
There are only three references to race in the complaint.
First, the appellant described himself as being of "Asian/
Philippeno [sic] " heritage. Second, the appellant alleges that he
informed the appellee of racial remarks that jurors had made to
him. Third, the appellant complains that no minorities were
empaneled on his jury. None of these references suggest that the
appellee acted with any racial or class-based discriminatory
animus.
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correct, the district court failed to note the more recent Supreme
Court case of Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984) in which
it was held that
public defenders are not immune from liability in actions
brought by a criminal defendant against state public
defenders who are alleged to have conspired with state
officials to deprive the §1983 plaintiff of federal
constitutional rights.
In the instant case, the district court failed to consider
the appellant's claims of a conspiracy between the appellees and
the prosecutor in determining whether the appellee was acting
7
under color of state law.
This court has spoken to the level of
proof necessary to establish state action by asserting a
conspiracy between private defendants and state officials. A
court must proceed with caution when considering the pre-trial
dismissal of conspiracy allegations in civil rights proceedings
because of the difficult nature of the proof involved.
Shamburg. 614 F.2d 156, 162 (10th Cir. 1980).

Fisher v.

However, "mere

conclusory allegations with no supporting factual averments are
insufficient; the pleadings must specifically present facts
The prosecutor is a state actor who is entitled to immunity
for actions taken in his official capacity. Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 420-29 (1976). Accordingly, if the appellant is
determined to have alleged sufficient facts to establish a
conspiracy between the appellee and the prosecutor, the appellee
can be found to have acted under color of state law for purposes
of Section 1983. See Tower, 467 U.S. at 923.
The appellant, in order "to show discrimination and
conspiracy in the action," alleged that the prosecutor and the
appellee: (1) were related through marriage; (2) had or were
representing members of the jury in unrelated legal matters; (3)
knew of and allowed perjured testimony to be admitted at trial;
(4) knew of and failed to object to violations of the exclusionary
rule; and (5) knew of the pretrial publicity but failed to move
for a change of venue.
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tending to show agreement and concerted action."

Sooner Products

Co. v. McBride, 708 F.2d 510, 512 (10th Cir. 1983).

"The standard

is even stricter where the state officials involved in the
conspiracy are immune from suit."

Id. at 512. As we set out in

Norton v. Liddel. 620 F.2d 1375, 1380 (10th Cir. 1980), the
plaintiff must demonstrate "the existence of a significant nexus
or entanglement between the absolutely immune state official and
the private party in relation to the steps taken by each to
fulfill the objects of their conspiracy."

III. Conclusion
Since the court failed to consider whether the appellee
conspired with the prosecutor to deny the appellant his
constitutional rights, we find that it abused its discretion in
dismissing the Section 1983 claim.

Accordingly, we REMAND for the

district court to reconsider its dismissal of the appellant's
Section 1983 claims in light of this opinion.

In all other

respects the district court's order is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge

